

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 237837

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 237837 SENT BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
OTTAWA COPENHAGEN BONN REYKJAVIK ROME LUXEMBOURG THE
HAGUE OSLO LISBON ANKARA LONDON NATO INFO USNMR SHAPE US-
LOSACLANT, DECEMBER 5TH:

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 237837

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: MCAP, NATO

SUBJECT: LETTER TO MINISTER OF DEFENSE

1. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO APPROPRIATELY PERSONALIZE AND DE-
LIVER TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE (ICELAND: APPROPRIATE
OFFICIAL) THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL LETTER (WITH SACEUR ENCLO-
SURES) FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER. SEPARATE
COVER LETTER FOR USNATO USE IN FORWARDING LETTERS TO SG
LUNS FOLLOWS THE SACEUR ENCLOSURES.

QUOTE

29 NOVEMBER 1973

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

I AM TAKING THE LIBERTY OF ENCLOSING COPIES OF TWO RECENT
SECRET

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LETTERS WHICH I RECEIVED FROM GENERAL GOODPASTER ADDRESSING
SOME OF THE MORE BASIC MILITARY ISSUES CONFRONTING THE NATO
ALLIANCE.

AS GENERAL GOODPASTER NOTES, NEITHER THE DEFICIENCIES HE DESCRIBES NOR THE IDEAS HE SUGGESTS ARE NEW. PROBABLY BECAUSE OF THAT FACT, WE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE WITH HIS PRESCRIPTION THAT A "VIGOROUS, COORDINATED EFFORT" IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT THE NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS.

IN MY JUDGMENT THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE TWO LETTERS MERIT THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION BY ALL OF US. DURING OUR DISCUSSION IN THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE MEETING NEXT MONTH I HOPE THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THESE MATTERS, AT LEAST PRELIMINARILY.

SINCERELY,

/S/J R SCHLESINGER

UNQUOTE

2. SACEUR ENCLOSURES TO ABOVE LETTERS FOLLOW.

QUOTE

SECRET

OCTOBER 23, 1973

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

DURING OUR MEETING ON 26 SEPTEMBER YOU MAY RECALL THAT I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO HIGHLIGHT TWO PROBLEMS THAT SEEM TO ME TO BE OF GREAT INTEREST AND PROFOUND SIGNIFICANCE. THEY ARE FLEXIBILITY (OR THE LACK OF IT) ON THE PART OF OUR NATO FORCES, AND THE ADVANTAGES OF THE INITIATIVE AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIETS. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE ARE THINGS WE CAN AND SHOULD BE DOING CONCERNING BOTH OF THEM, AND THAT THESE THINGS COULD USEFULLY BE GATHERED, IN MY OPINION, INTO TWO MAIN CONSTRUCTIVE THRUSTS TO WHICH YOU MIGHT WELL WISH TO GIVE A STRONG PUSH. I SHALL BE DOING SO FROM HERE.

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YOU ASKED THAT I LET YOU HAVE A STATEMENT IDENTIFYING SPECIFICS AS TO ACTIONS ON THESE PROBLEMS. I AM SENDING A SEPARATE LETTER CONCERNING THE MATTER OF SOVIET INITIATIVE. THE PRESENT LETTER SETS OUT SOME OF THE ACTION AREAS THAT ARE GEARED TO PROVIDING MUCH GREATER FLEXIBILITY FOR OUR FORCES THAN WE HAVE TODAY, IN TERMS OF THE WAY THEY ARE CAPABLE OF BEING EMPLOYED IN DEFENSE OPERATIONS.

THE DRIVING CONSIDERATION BEHIND THIS PROPOSAL TO BUILD GREATER FLEXIBILITY IS SIMPLY THAT WE ARE NOT NOW ABLE TO GET, FROM THESE POWERFUL AND-EXPENSIVE FORCES, ANYTHING LIKE THE FULL SCALE OF EFFECTIVENESS THAT THEY SHOULD PROVIDE. IN THIS LETTER I AM SPEAKING BRIEFLY OF OUR

AIR FORCES AND PRIMARILY OF OUR GROUND FORCES IN THE
CENTRAL REGION, BUT THE SAME POSSIBILITIES EXIST AND NEED
TO BE DEVELOPED THROUGHOUT ALL ELEMENTS OF THE COMMAND.

WITH REGARD TO AIR FORCES, THE PROPOSED AIR REORGANIZATION
WHICH I HAVE NOW SENT FORWARD TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK -- BUT ONLY A FRAMEWORK -- FOR CON-
STRUCTIVE MEASURES TO ACHIEVE OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY.
THE REAL RESULTS WILL ONLY COME WHEN WE HAVE PUT INTO
EFFECT A SERIES OF SPECIFIC MEASURES INCLUDING THOSE
LISTED BELOW. IN THIS LATTER RESPECT THERE IS SIGNIFICANT
EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE GOING TO ENCOUNTER A LOT OF RESIS-
TANCE AND OBSTRUCTION AS WE MOVE ON THESE SPECIFIC PRO-
GRAMS. YOUR STRONG HELP WILL BE NEEDED. THE MEASURES
I AM SPEAKING OF INCLUDE:

- IMPROVING AND STANDARDIZING THE AIRCRAFT, WEAPONS,
AND EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE CURRENTLY;

- PROVIDING A REGION-WIDE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL
SYSTEM TO ENABLE AIR ELEMENTS TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY
THROUGHOUT THE REGION, AND TO BE AUGMENTED QUICKLY AND
EFFICIENTLY;

- DEVELOPING IMPROVED COMMAND FACILITIES, ADP AND
MOBILE COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS;

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- PROVIDING MODERNIZED, RELIABLE, SECURE COMMUNICA-
TIONS;

- STANDARDIZING OR HARMONIZING OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS,
METHODS AND TRAINING;

- AND ALL THE OTHER PRACTICAL MEASURES THAT ARE
NEEDED TO SPEED THE TRANSITION OF NATIONAL FORCES INTO
A COHESIVE, ALLIED FORCE FOR REGION-WIDE APPLICATION
IN EMERGENCY OR WAR.

ON THE GROUND, OUR POSTURE IS, IF ANYTHING, JUST AS
BAD AS REGARDS THE CAPABILITY FOR FLEXIBILITY IN EMPLOYMENT
OF OUR FORCES. WHAT WE HAVE, IN A TERM USED BY GENERAL
FERBER WHEN I DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH HIM DURING
HIS FIRST VISIT, IS A "LAYER CAKE" -- A STACK OF EAST-
WEST-ORIENTED CORPS AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN WHICH
ARE DEPLOYED, FROM BOTTOM TO TOP, THE II GERMAN CORPS,
THE VII US CORPS, THE V US CORPS, THE III GERMAN CORPS,
THE BELGIAN CORPS, THE I BRITISH CORPS, THE I GERMAN
CORPS, AND THE NETHERLANDS CORPS. -BECAUSE THEY HAVE
DIFFERENT WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT THESE CORPS FORCES ARE
TIED TO LOGISTIC STRUCTURES OF THEIR OWN THAT LIE ALMOST

ENTIRELY WITHIN OR JUST BEHIND THEIR RESPECTIVE

CORPS AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. EXCEPT FOR POL, A CERTAIN LIMITED NUMBER OF TYPES OF AMMUNITION AND SPARE PARTS, AND (POSSIBLY) RATIONS, THERE IS NOTHING REMOTELY APPROACHING AN AREA LOGISTICS SYSTEM FROM WHICH THESE FORCES COULD BE MAINTAINED IN LARGE-SCALE FLEXIBLE OPERATIONS RESPONDING RAPIDLY TO MAIN ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS AND DIRECTIONS OF ATTACK. TABLES OF ORGANIZATION DIFFER, AS DO THE FORCE STRUCTURES OF THE CORPS FORCES OF THE DIFFERENT NATIONS, I.E., THE "SLICE" OF SUPPORTING FORMATIONS BEHIND THE COMBAT DIVISIONS.

TWO SPECIFIC AND CONCRETE AREAS WHEREIN GREAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE --AT LESSER COSTS THAN TODAY BUT WITH GREATER EFFECTIVENESS THAN TODAY, THOUGH AT SOME DAMAGE TO NATIONAL PREROGATIVES AND POSSIBLY TO COMMERCIAL
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INTERESTS IN SOME INSTANCES -- ARE IN THE FIELDS OF STANDARDIZATION AND LOGISTICS. THE TWO ARE OBVIOUSLY INTERCONNECTED.

INCREASED STANDARDIZATION -- AND MOVES IN THAT DIRECTION, INCLUDING INCREASED INTEROPERABILITY AND INTERCHANGEABILITY -- WILL CONTRIBUTE TO FLEXIBILITY BOTH DIRECTLY AND VIA THE IMPROVED LOGISTICS SYSTEM IT WILL HELP TO MAKE POSSIBLE. A NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES AND AGENCIES IN NATO ARE PRESENTLY INVOLVED IN THIS AREA, AND SHAPE IS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS WORK (FOR EXAMPLE, BY IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES THAT ARE REQUIRED AND APPEAR TO BE TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE, AND BY SPELLING OUT, FOR EACH MAJOR CLASS OF EQUIPMENT, JUST WHERE THERE IS A REQUIREMENT FOR STANDARDIZATION, INTEROPERABILITY, OR INTERCHANGEABILITY). HOWEVER, THE OVER ALL EFFORT CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS FEEBLE AND LAGGARD IN TERMS OF ANY ACCOMPLISHMENT. THIS IS A FIELD THAT IS WORTHY OF YOUR CAREFUL, PERSONAL EXAMINATION AND STIMULUS.

WITH REGARD TO LOGISTICS, WE START FROM THE PROPOSITION THAT A QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY SOUND LOGISTICS BASE IS A PREREQUISITE TO THE CAPABILITY FOR CONDUCTING EXTENDED CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS THAT IS ENVISAGED BY NATOS STRATEGIC CONCEPT (MC 14/3). FOR THIS REASON, IMPROVEMENT IN THE LOGISTICS POSTURE IN ACE HAS BEEN AND REMAINS ONE OF SHAPES PRIMARY GOALS. RECOGNIZING FURTHER THAT THIS IMPROVEMENT MUST BR ACCOMPLISHED WITH MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY, WE VIEW THE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITHIN NATO ON "RATIONALIZATION" AS POTENTIALLY OF GREAT BENEFIT. IN SHAPE-S VIEW, RATIONALIZATION OF TASKS CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH GREATER STANDARDIZATION

AND THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXISTING SCHEMES SUCH AS THOSE INITIATED BY THE EUROGROUP, VIS: EUROLOG AND EUROTRAINING, LOOKING TOWARD ULTIMATE COMMON LOGISTIC SYSTEMS AND COMMON PROCUREMENT ARRANGEMENTS. MOREOVER, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM SOME OF THE CURRENT PROPOSALS WITH REGARD TO SPECIALIZATION NOW BEING DELIBERATED WITHIN NATO, RATIONALIZATION DOES NOT AFFECT THE BALANCE OF NATIONAL FORCES, AN AREA WHERE PROGRESS WILL INEVITABLY
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COME WITH MORE DIFFICULTY.

OUR MAJOR GOAL IN THE LOGISTICS AREA IS TO ATTAIN A LOGISTICS STRUCTURE THAT WILL PROVIDE A CAPABILITY FOR SUSTAINED SUPPORT INCLUDING ADEQUATE USABLE RESERVE STOCKS AND EQUIPMENT (INITIALLY UP TO AT LEAST 30 DAYS CAPABILITY) AS WELL AS THE CAPABILITY FOR RECEPTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENTS. TOWARD THIS END CERTAIN OF THE SPECIFIC PROGRAMS TO WHICH SHAPE IS GIVING IMMEDIATE ATTENTION ARE, IN SUMMARY TERMS:

- CONSTRUCTION OF A SYSTEM OF FORWARD STORAGE SITES CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING NATO GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA.

- DEFINITION OF MAJOR LOGISTICS DEFICIENCIES LIMITING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY THAT CAN BE OVERCOME BY COMMON-FUNDED INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, AS WELL AS WEAK AREAS IN OUR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES WHERE BILATERAL AND/OR MULTILATERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS COULD BE OF PARTICULAR VALUE.

- IDENTIFICATION OF THOSE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMS REQUIRED TO ACCOMMODATE THE EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENTS SUPPORTING CONTINGENCY AND/OR WAR PLANS.

- IDENTIFICATION OF, AND SUBMISSION OF PROPOSALS TO SOLVE, THE PROBLEMS OF MAL-POSITIONED STOCKS AND SHORTFALLS IN THE LOGISTICS LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS THROUGHOUT ACE.

- RECOMMENDATION OF AREAS OF LOGISTICS THAT CAN BE EARMARKED FOR RATIONALIZATION (AND POSSIBLY SPECIALIZATION) WITH THE GOAL OF REDUCING NATIONAL COSTS; KEEPING IN MIND THAT THIS GOAL IS PARTICULARLY DEPENDENT UPON THE NATIONS ACCEPTANCE OF SOME INCREASED DEGREE OF LOGISTIC INTEGRATION.

- FEASIBILITY OF PRACTICAL, POSITIVE, COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WHICH WOULD IMPROVE WAR STOCK LEVELS AND RESUPPLY CAPABILITY.

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WHILE WE STILL REGULARLY ENCOUNTER THE TRADITIONAL PROTECTIVE SHIELD THAT "LOGISTICS IS A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY," IN FACT WE ARE ALSO FINDING SOME DEGREE OF READINESS AMONG THE NATIONS TO CONSIDER AND COOPERATE IN EFFORTS ALONG THESE LINES.

INDIVIDUALLY, THE IDEAS CITED ABOVE ARE OBVIOUSLY NOT NEW, BUT SUCCESS DEPENDS ON THE COLLECTIVE ACCEPTANCE BY NATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS EACH ONE OF THEM INVOLVE, AND ON VIGOROUS, COORDINATED EFFORT OVER A SUSTAINED PERIOD TO BRING THEM TO FRUITION. YOUR SUPPORT IN THESE AREAS IS WARMLY SOLICITED.

I HOPE YOU WILL PUT BOTH OF THESE PROJECTS -- INCREASED STANDARDIZATION AND IMPROVED LOGISTICS IN SUPPORT OF A GREATER CAPABILITY FOR FLEXIBILITY OF EMPLOYMENT -- ON YOUR ACTION PROGRAM.

WITH BEST WISHES,

SINCERELY,

/S/ A. J. GOODPASTER
SECRET

SECRET 24 OCTOBER 1973

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

THIS LETTER CONCERNS ITSELF WITH THE SECOND PROBLEM AREA OF THE TWO I DISCUSSED WITH YOU DURING OUR MEETING LAST MONTH: THE INITIATIVE AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIETS WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO FORCES IN THE CENTRAL REGION, AND THE OFFSETTING MEASURES WE CAN AND SHOULD TAKE, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS OF FORCE READINESS AND RESPONSE TIMES. (THE FIRST PROBLEM -INCREASED FLEXIBILITY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR NATO FORCES, PARTICULARLY THROUGH INCREASED STANDARDIZATION, RATIONALIZATION AND IMPROVED LOGISTICS -- WAS THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE LETTER I SENT TO YOU YESTERDAY.)

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THE INITIATIVE AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIETS PROVIDES THEM MULTIPLE MILITARY ADVANTAGES THROUGH THE OPPORTUNITY IT OFFERS THEM FOR CHOICE OF TIME, PLACE, MODE (TYPE OF FORCES AND OPERATIONS), AND WEIGHT OF ATTACK. SINCE WE DO NOT KNOW THEIR PLANS, WE ARE OBLIGED TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE TO TRY TO POSTURE OURSELVES SO AS TO

BE PREPARED AT ANY TIME, AT MANY PLACES, AGAINST MANY FORMS OF ATTACK AND AGAINST VARIOUS SIZES OF ATTACK RANGING FROM LIMITED WARSAW PACT FORCES IN SURPRISE ATTACK TO FULLY MOBILIZED FORCES IN A MORE DELIBERATELY PREPARED ATTACK PROVIDING GREATER WARNING TO US. THE INITIATIVE ALSO GIVES THEM SOME SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES RELATING TO THE IN-BEING FORCE POSTURE THEY MAINTAIN IN PEACETIME, AND TO THEIR CAPABILITY FOR IMPROVING IT QUICKLY -- FOR EXAMPLE, BY CALLING UP LOGISTIC SUPPORT AT A TIME OF THEIR CHOOSING, AS IN THE CASE OF THEIR INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968. WE, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF OUR LOGISTIC STRUCTURE AT ALL TIMES. THEY CAN, OF COURSE, ALSO "GENERATE" THEIR TACTICAL FORCES QUICKLY AT A TIME OF THEIR CHOOSING, WHILE WE MUST KEEP OUR FORCES AT A HIGH STATE OF READINESS OR RELY ON QUICK FILLING OUT AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNITS IN CASE OF WARNING, OR DO BOTH.

THESE CONSIDERATIONS PUT A HIGH PREMIUM ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF READINESS OF BOTH STANDING FORCES AND RESERVE FORCES, AS WELL AS IMPROVEMENT IN THE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES OF OUR FORCES. HIGHLIGHTED BELOW ARE SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT MEASURES ALONG THESE LINES WHICH CONTINUE TO BE PRIORITY SHAPE NEEDS AND OBJECTIVES:

- OF BASIC IMPORTANCE IS IMPROVEMENT IN NATO WARNING CAPABILITIES. THE ON-GOING COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS, AS WELL AS OTHER MEASURES IN THE C3 FIELD, ARE OF GREAT VALUE IN STRENGTHENING THE MACHINERY OF DECISION AND RESPONSE. BEYOND THIS, THE HEART OF THE ISSUE LIES IN THE ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE, EVALUATE AND ACT ON WARNING INDICATORS. HERE ACE AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF NATO WILL CONTINUE TO BE DEPENDENT ON NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, PARTICULARLY THAT OF THE US. THE DECISION
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TO MOVE TO HIGHER ALERT STAGES WILL REMAIN A CRITICAL STEP, IN WHICH US INITIATIVE WILL BE VITAL, SINCE SUCH DECISION MARKS THE BEGINNING OF "PREPARATION TIME" FOR OUR FORCES. THE WORK OF THE US TO CLARIFY AND STRENGTHEN CAPABILITIES IN THIS FIELD IS THEREFORE A CONTRIBUTION OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TOWARD IMPROVED FULFILLMENT OF THIS NEED.

-RESPONSIVE, FUNCTION MOBILIZATION AND RESERVE SYSTEMS, WHICH WILL PRODUCE EFFECTIVE UNITS QUICKLY AND WHICH ARE GEARED TO THE EARLIEST PHASES OF THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM, ARE ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE. THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM OPERATES IN RESPONSE TO RECOGNITION OF MILITARY INDICATORS, COMMANDERS REQUESTS FOR DECLARATION OF A STATE OF ALERT (OR MEASURES THEREOF)

AND CONCURRENCE THEREIN BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF NATIONS IN THE NAC/DPC. WHERE THE NATIONS HAVE ESTABLISHED THE PROCEDURE OF RESPONDING TO THESE STATES OF ALERT BY IMMEDIATE RECALL AND MOBILIZATION MEASURES UPON THE DECISION OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE (WITHOUT THE NEED FOR PARLIAMENTARY CONSULTATION AND DECISION) A MORE RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTIVE POSTURE FOR EARLY REINFORCEMENT OF STANDING FORCES IS ACHIEVED. THIS NEED IS PERTINENT AT THE PRESENT TIME IN VIEW OF THE TREND OF NATO NATIONS TOWARD RESTRUCTURING AND REDUCING THE LEVELS OF IN-BEING FORCE (AS WELL AS REDUCING THE PERIODS OF CONSCRIPT SERVICE). TO THE EXTENT THE READINESS OF RESERVE FORCES AT AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS IS DELAYED (E.G., UNTIL THE IN-PLACE REGULAR FORCES HAVE REACHED A CRITICAL SITUATION), THEIR OVERALL VALUE IS OBVIOUSLY DIMINISHED. MEASURES TO ADVANCE AND ASSURE THE READINESS OF RESERVE FORCES THEREFORE HAVE A HIGH PAY-OFF.

- IN VIEW OF THE HEAVY RELIANCE PLACED BY NATO ON AUGMENTATION FORCES, THE NATIONS COULD IMPROVE OUR DEFENSE POSTURE BY IMPROVING THE READINESS OF THESE FORCES AND BY MAKING A FIRMER COMMITMENT AS TO THEIR AVAILABILITY IN RESPONSE TO MILITARY ALERTING MEASURES. SOME NATIONS, INCLUDING THE US, HAVE AGREED TO SHIFT
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CERTAIN FORCES COMMITTED TO SACEUR TO AN EARLIER AVAILABILITY CATEGORY, AND THIS COULD BE DONE WITH MORE OF THE FORCES OF NATO. SUCH NATIONAL "INDICATIONS" OF EARLIER AVAILABILITY OF AUGMENTING FORCES SERVE TO IMPROVE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE'S OVERALL POSITION. HOWEVER, THEY FALL SHORT OF WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR US IF WE ARE TO DO MEANINGFUL PLANNING (OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC) FOR THEIR RECEPTION AND EMPLOYMENT (AND SUCH PLANNING, TOGETHER WITH INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMS, WILL ITSELF MAKE POSSIBLE FOR SUCH UNITS TO ACHIEVE AN EARLIER COMBAT-READY STATUS IN THE THEATER). FOR SUCH PLANNING TO PROCEED, THESE AUGMENTING FORCES NEED TO BE SHIFTED INTO THE STATUS OF FORCES FIRMLY COMMITTED TO SACEUR. THE RECENT US DECISION NOT TO COMMIT EIGHT ADDITIONAL AIR SQUADRONS FROM THE "OTHER" FORCES CATEGORY TO SACEUR'S STRATEGIC RESERVE IS BUT ONE EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEM; IN THIS INSTANCE, WE ARE UNABLE TO BRING THESE REINFORCEMENTS FIRMLY INTO OUR ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE PLANNING -- AND ARE UNABLE TO DEVELOP IN INTERNATIONAL CHANNELS THE NATO SUPPORT (INCLUDING LONG LEAD-TIME INFRASTRUCTURE THAT IS REQUIRED TO MAKE POSSIBLE THEIR TIMELY RECEPTION AND MOST EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION WHEN DEPLOYED TO EUROPE.

SHAPE CONTINUES ITS EFFORT TO HAVE THE READINESS OF

AUGMENTATION FORCES ADVANCED, AND FIRM COMMITMENTS MADE REGARDING THEIR AVAILABILITY.

- MAL-DEPLOYMENT OF EXISTING FORCES AND SUPPORTING LOGISTICAL STOCKS IMPACTS DIRECTLY ON READINESS. SHAPE CONSIDERS THAT THE ACE FORCES WHICH WOULD TAKE THE INITIAL SHOCK OF ENEMY ATTACK SHOULD BE POSITIONED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ACCOMPLISH A TRUE FORWARD DEFENSE WITHOUT HAVING TO RELY ON MAJOR MOVEMENTS OR MOBILIZATION; YET, SOME NATIONAL FORCES IN ACE REQUIRE EXTENSIVE FILLING AND REINFORCING BEFORE THEY BECOME COMBAT CAPABLE; OTHERS, PARTICULARLY IN THE BENELUX AREA, MUST MOVE CONSIDERABLE DISTANCES INTO FIXED POSITIONS AT JUST THE TIME THAT INTERNAL ROAD AND RAIL SYSTEMS ARE LIKELY TO BE MOST CONGESTED. MOREOVER, THE NATO FORCES SHOULD BE BACKED BY AT LEAST 30 DAYS OF PROPERLY LOCATED LOGISTIC STOCKS. THESE PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN HIGHLIGHTED, QUITE AUTHORITATIVELY, IN AD-70 AND OTHER STUDIES; NEVERTHELESS, AS OF TODAY, SOME 28 NATO BRIGADES IN THE CENTRAL REGION STILL MUST MOVE MORE THAN 100 KILOMETERS TO REACH THEIR GDP POSITIONS.

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- A FURTHER AREA OF NEEDED ACTION RELATES TO A TREND IN EVIDENCE ON THE PART OF SOME NATIONS TO SHIFT THE REPORTING OF THEIR COMMITTED FORCES FROM AN "ASSIGNED" STATUS TO AN "EARMARKED" CATEGORY. THIS CHANGE IN REPORTING OF FORCES IS SUBSTANTIVE IN ITS EFFECT, FOR THE LESS DEFINITIVE AND RESPONSIVE STATUS OF "EARMARKED" FORCES COULD LEAD TO AN ATTENUATION OF NATO INTEGRATION AND SACEURS AUTHORITY. I HAVE RECENTLY MADE A REQUEST TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO TAKE ACTION AIMED AT REVERSING THIS TREND.

-- OUR PROGRAM OF EVALUATION OF FORCES MAKES AN IMPORTANT AND ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO READINESS. IN CONNECTION WITH A CURRENT ACTION IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO REVISE SACEURS OVERALL TERMS OF REFERENCE, SHAPE IS TAKING A STRONG STAND TO PRESERVE AND BROADEN THE AUTHORITY IN SACEURS CURRENT TERMS OF REFERENCE, WHEREBY COMPREHE

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